ajparker
05-26-2004, 09:02 PM
I've been away for the forum, but have come back with a question....
Today I've had LITERALLY 1000+ messages that exhibit the following characteristics....
All are from the maildeliverysubsystem (mailerdaemon@mydomain.com) and the failure was of a delivery to root@mydomain.com.... (I get postmasters mail, so I get these bounces) in digging deeper, the message that was to be delivered to root@mydomain.com was itself a delivery failure of a messages SENT FROM a script called cgiemail according to the info... what's more it apparently was sent through MY cgi-bin on my site...
Most of these apparently failed delivery for a number of reasons.... The most common explanation is this....
Your mail to the following recipients could not be delivered because they are not accepting mail from UnknownSender@UnknownDomain:
jereltrout
jerrybla12
jensencpa
Now at this point I start looking through my httpd access_logs and see TONS of hits on mydomain.com/cgi-bin/cgiemail/forms/order.txt and of course the returned headers (some bounces included headers, some didn't...) showed ...
X-Mailer: cgiemail 1.6
(form="http://mydomain.com/")
(action="/cgi-bin/cgiemail/forms/order.txt")
I start investigating cgiemail and don't recall installing it, beginning to suspect a hacking I check some of my other reseller sites, all of which have it, so now I assume it's a generic westhost script. To stem the tide this morning (actually most of the hits were yesterday, so maybe the flow of delivery failures will stop by tomorrow...) I've removed ALL permissions (rwx) from the script so it can't be executed at all.
What's ... well, impressive is the pulls to that script came from a NUMBER of different ip addresses.
Ultimately, I guess my question is - is it possible that this was a test run of an exploit against cgiemail? Perhaps a refining of HOW someone calls the script could allow them to correct the unkownsender@unkowndomain failures. Is there no http_referrer protection in this script to keep it from being called? I've never used the script myself, but a brief look doesn't seem to indicate any such setting.
Right now, I've done a count out of curiousity....
cat access_log | grep cgiemail |wc -l
on the server shows 629 (attempted) accesses of that script. (5 or so are me.) 42 of which have been since I disabled it (giving out 403 errors now.) It looks as though at about 10 after 10 this morning they realized they were getting 403 errors and probably removed the address from whatever zombie network is doing this... (there haven't been any hits on it in 10 hours (outside of me a few minutes ago...)
Something tells me I need to beat the rush and start disabling it on EVERY account I have before I get 8x as many failure messages....
any thoughts? comments?
anyone notice similar behavior?
Thanks,
Avery
Today I've had LITERALLY 1000+ messages that exhibit the following characteristics....
All are from the maildeliverysubsystem (mailerdaemon@mydomain.com) and the failure was of a delivery to root@mydomain.com.... (I get postmasters mail, so I get these bounces) in digging deeper, the message that was to be delivered to root@mydomain.com was itself a delivery failure of a messages SENT FROM a script called cgiemail according to the info... what's more it apparently was sent through MY cgi-bin on my site...
Most of these apparently failed delivery for a number of reasons.... The most common explanation is this....
Your mail to the following recipients could not be delivered because they are not accepting mail from UnknownSender@UnknownDomain:
jereltrout
jerrybla12
jensencpa
Now at this point I start looking through my httpd access_logs and see TONS of hits on mydomain.com/cgi-bin/cgiemail/forms/order.txt and of course the returned headers (some bounces included headers, some didn't...) showed ...
X-Mailer: cgiemail 1.6
(form="http://mydomain.com/")
(action="/cgi-bin/cgiemail/forms/order.txt")
I start investigating cgiemail and don't recall installing it, beginning to suspect a hacking I check some of my other reseller sites, all of which have it, so now I assume it's a generic westhost script. To stem the tide this morning (actually most of the hits were yesterday, so maybe the flow of delivery failures will stop by tomorrow...) I've removed ALL permissions (rwx) from the script so it can't be executed at all.
What's ... well, impressive is the pulls to that script came from a NUMBER of different ip addresses.
Ultimately, I guess my question is - is it possible that this was a test run of an exploit against cgiemail? Perhaps a refining of HOW someone calls the script could allow them to correct the unkownsender@unkowndomain failures. Is there no http_referrer protection in this script to keep it from being called? I've never used the script myself, but a brief look doesn't seem to indicate any such setting.
Right now, I've done a count out of curiousity....
cat access_log | grep cgiemail |wc -l
on the server shows 629 (attempted) accesses of that script. (5 or so are me.) 42 of which have been since I disabled it (giving out 403 errors now.) It looks as though at about 10 after 10 this morning they realized they were getting 403 errors and probably removed the address from whatever zombie network is doing this... (there haven't been any hits on it in 10 hours (outside of me a few minutes ago...)
Something tells me I need to beat the rush and start disabling it on EVERY account I have before I get 8x as many failure messages....
any thoughts? comments?
anyone notice similar behavior?
Thanks,
Avery